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Abstract
Career concerns can mitigate moral hazard problems, but these diminish as
the agent’s retirement age approaches. Addressing this problem, this note draws
attention to the role of the interaction between contractible and non-contractible
signals.
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1 Introduction
An open question concerning models of incentives in organizations is whether career con-
cerns alleviate moral hazard problems throughout a person’s career (Holmstro¨m 1999).
The assumption underlying this question is that motivating people in organizations re-
quires explicit formal contracts linking monetary rewards to contractible signals that
provide information about their unobservable behavior.
Using dynamic incentive models in which only non-contractible signals were observ-
able, Holmstro¨m (1999)1 argued that under very restrictive conditions, career concerns
could be sufficient to police moral hazard problems. Gibbons and Murphy (1992), building
on the models of Holmstro¨m (1999), replaced non-contractible signals with contractible
signals. They demonstrated the feature of diminishing career concerns and the role of
contracts that is increasingly prominent as an individual approaches retirement.
This note demonstrates that when both contractible and non-contractible signals are
observed, the dynamic career concern effect changes, becoming either weaker or stronger.
It further shows the gradual disappearance of career concern effects, which supports the
robustness of the results of Gibbons and Murphy (1992). The case of both contractible
and non-contractible signals is a natural extension of the existing literature, which is moti-
vated by a general concern about observability that is not restricted either to contractible
or non-contractible signals.
2 Model
Consider risk-neutral prospective employers (the market) and a risk-neutral agent who
has a finite N horizon. The agent’s outputs are the sum of the agent’s talent regarding
which the common prior belief is a stochastic variable: θ ∼ N(0, 1υθ ), the agent’s actions:
1Holmstro¨m (1999) was originally written in April 1982 for an unpublished volume in honour of
the 60th birthday of Professor Lars Wahla¨ck, Rector of the Swedish School of Economics and Business
Administration in Helsinki, Finland.
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at ∈ R, and the noise term: τt ∼ N(0, 1υτ ):
xt = θ + bat + τt, b ∈ (0,∞), t = 1, . . . , N.
The outputs xt and the actions at are not observable. Observable signals are contractible
signals: yt and non-contractible signals: zt:
yt = θ +mat + εt,
zt = θ + pat + νt, t = 1, . . . , N.
Their differences lie in the marginal impacts of the agent’s actions: m ∈ (0,∞) and
p ∈ R, and in noise terms: εt ∼ N(0, 1υε ) and νt ∼ N(0, 1υν ). The agent’s talent θ and
noise terms τt, εt and νt are independent of each other.
To focus on the impact of the interaction between contractible and non-contractible
signals on career concerns, this note assumes that contractible signals yt are distorted in
the sense that b < m. In addition, contracts and the agent’s personal cost of action are
restricted to being linear and quadratic, respectively:
wt(yt) = αt + βtyt, αt, βt ∈ R,
c(at) =
1
2
a2t , t = 1, . . . , N.
Figure 1 summarizes the sequence of events.
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Figure 1: Timing of Events
The equilibrium outcomes in the information structure are summarized as follows:
Theorem 1. Suppose b < m. In equilibrium, actions and contractual incentives are as
3
follows:
a∗t = b for t = 1, . . . , N, (1)
β∗N =
b
m
, (2)
β∗t =
b
m
−
N∑
k=t+1
γk−t(1− β∗k)
υε + υν
p
m
(k − 1)(υε + υν) + υθ (3)
for t = 1, . . . , N − 1,
where γ is the discount rate.
All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
In the second term on the right-hand side of (3), the equilibrium implicit incentives
for period t, t = 1, . . . , N − 1 are expressed. This is because the equilibrium contractual
incentives are imposed so that the effective incentives (the sum of contractual and implicit
incentives) reach the level bm , where the first-best action b is induced. Note that the last
period’s equilibrium implicit incentive is zero.
3 Results
3.1 A weaker career concern effect
Non-contractible signals are not restricted to good signals with the monotone likelihood
ratio property (MLRP), whereby higher signals represent better news. Consider the
extreme case of υε + υν
p
m = 0 where the implicit incentive is zero and β
∗
t =
b
m , t =
1, . . . , N . In this case, bad news conveyed by non-contractible signals cancels out career
concern effects throughout the agent’s career. Note that the worse case of υε + υν
p
m < 0
will be infeasible if the agent does not accept a contract in which the fixed payment is
strongly negative.
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3.2 A stronger career concern effect
Non-contractible signals can strengthen career concern effects when they are more re-
sponsive to actions than contractible signals, i.e., implicit incentives are increasing in
p
m . In addition, if
p
m > 1, the implicit incentives are increasing in the precision of non-
contractible signals, υν . The former instance has a stronger impact. Figure 2 illustrates
this effect. The deep drop of contractual incentives in the fourth quadrant occurs because
the coefficients (1− β∗k) in the right-hand side of equation (3) expand implicit incentives
in the fourth quadrant while shrinking them in the first quadrant.
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Figure 2: The equilibrium contractual incentives: N = 15, γ = 0.95, bm = 0.5, υ
2
ε = υ2ν = υ2θ .
3.3 A robust property: Diminishing career concerns effects
By a robust property, this note means that in the presence of non-contractible signals,
contractual incentives still increase monotonically as they did in the model of Gibbons
and Murphy (1992). That is, career concerns diminish as the agent’s retirement age
approaches.
Theorem 2. Suppose b < m and υε+
p
mυν > 0. Then, the optimal incentive rates exhibit
the property: β∗t < β
∗
t+1 for t = 1, . . . , N − 1.
The main cause of this property in this model is the agent’s time horizon; stronger
career concerns are closely associated with a longer time horizon. Non-contractible signals
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do not alter this. Hence, contracts are required to deter moral hazard problems.
However, theoretically, career concern effects can be made sufficient to police moral
hazards during every period except the final one, by setting a high enough value for
p
m . However, in this case, severe penalty contracts might be seen in equilibrium. If
employers refrain from implementing these penalty contracts, the agent continues to
focus on developing his or her reputation at the cost of overworking.
4 Conclusion
This note has shown that a dynamic perspective on career concern effects can be de-
veloped by considering an information structure in which both contractible and non-
contractible signals are observable. Further work may explore whether career concern
effects are sustained even if the agent’s overwork decreases the agent’s productivity.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1.
The prospective employers’ problem is
max
βt
Eˆt−1
[ N∑
k=t
γk−t
(
wk − 12a
2
k
)]
, (A-1)
subject to the zero-profit constraint of the market:
Eˆt−1
[ N∑
k=t
wk
]
= Eˆt−1
[ N∑
k=t
xk
]
for t = 1, . . . , N, (A-2)
and the agent’s choice of action:
a∗t =
∂Et−1
[ N∑
k=t
γk−twk
]
∂at
, (A-3)
where Et−1[·] = E[·|y1, . . . , yt−1, z1, . . . , zt−1].
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Note that wt can be expressed as wt = Eˆt−1[xt]+βt(yt− Eˆt−1[yt]) (this proof is shown
in S¸abac 2008, Lemma 1), which implies the equilibrium action in (A-3) is
a∗t =
∂Et−1
[
N∑
k=t
γk−t
(
Eˆk−1[xk] + βk(yk − Eˆk−1[yk])
)]
∂at
.
LetHykt andH
z
kt be the impact of observed contractible and non-contractible signal history
on date t on conditional expectations of yk, with components H
y
kt = (H
y1
kt , . . . , H
yt
kt) and
Hzkt = (H
z1
kt , . . . , H
zt
kt), respectively. Then
a∗t =
N∑
k=t
γk−t(1− βk)
(
Hytk k−1m+H
zt
k k−1p
)
+mβt. (A-4)
Note that the impact of observed signal history on date t on conditional expectations of
xk is the same as that of yk, because correlation structure is the same in both cases.
On the other hand, the first-order condition with respect to βt in (A-1) is
b
∂at
∂βt
− at ∂at
∂βt
= 0 for t = 1, . . . , N.
But by (A-4) ∂at∂βt = m, which implies
a∗t = b for t = 1, . . . , N,
which in turn implies
β∗t =
b
m
−
N∑
k=t+1
γk−t(1− βk)
(
Hytk k−1 +H
zt
k k−1
p
m
)
for t = 1, . . . , N − 1,
and β∗N =
b
m . Let δt = θ + εt and let ηt = θ + νt. Then
Ek−1[δk] =
υε
(k − 1)(υε + υν) + υθ (δ1 + · · · + δk−1)
+
υν
(k − 1)(υν + υε) + υθ (η1 + · · · + ηk−1), (A-5)
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which implies
Hytk k−1 =
υε
(k − 1)(υε + υν) + υθ and H
zt
k k−1 =
υν
(k − 1)(υν + υε) + υθ
for 1 ≤ t ≤ k − 1, and which ultimately implies (3) in Theorem 1.
The proof of (A-5) is obtained by induction on k. Let ζk be the normalized random
variable:
ζk =
 δk−Ek−1[δk]√V ark−1(δk)
1√
1−ρ2
(
ηk−Ek−1[ηk]√
V ark−1(ηk)
− ρ δk−Ek−1[δk]√
V ark−1(δk)
)
 ,
where ρ = Covk−1(δk, ηk)√
V ark−1(δk)V ark−1(ηk)
. Note that ζk is independent of δ1, . . . , δk−1, η1, . . . , ηn−1,
which implies the conditional expectation of δk+1 can be expressed as
Ek[δk+1] = Ek−1[δk+1] + Cov(δk+1, ζk)ζk
= Ek−1[δk] + Cov(δk+1, ζk)ζk. (A-6)
For k = 2, (A-5) follows from
E1[δ2] =
υε
υε + υν + υθ
δ1 +
υν
υε + υν + υθ
η1.
Suppose that (A-5) holds for k. By (A-6)
Ek[δk+1] = Ek−1[δk] + Cov(δk+1, ζk)ζk
= Ek−1[δk] +
υε
k(υε + υν) + υθ
(δk − Ek−1[δk])
+
υν
k(υε + υν) + υθ
(ηk − Ek−1[ηk])
=
υε
k(υε + υν) + υθ
(δ1 + · · · + δk)
+
υν
k(υε + υν) + υθ
(η1 + · · · + ηk).
The last equation is because Ek−1[δk] = Ek−1[ηk]. This proves the induction hypothesis
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(A-5) and concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 2.
Consider the following hypothesis on k, k = 1, . . . , N − 1.
β∗N−k ≤ β∗N−k+1 − γk(1−
b
m
)
υε + υν
p
m
(N − 1)(υε + υν) + υθ , (A-7)
which implies β∗N−k < β
∗
N−k+1 for k = 1, . . . , N − 1. The proof is by induction on k. For
k = 1, by (2) and (3)
β∗N−1 = β
∗
N − γ(1−
b
m
)
υε + υν
p
m
(N − 1)(υε + υν) + υθ .
Suppose that the induction hypothesis (A-7) holds for k − 1. By (2) and (3), β∗N−k is
given by
β∗N−k =
b
m
− γk(1− β∗N)
υε + υν
p
m
(N − 1)(υε + υν) + υθ
−
N−1∑
i=N−k+1
γi−(N−k)(1− β∗i )
υε + υν
p
m
(i− 1)(υε + υν) + υθ .
Let Ai = −(1−β∗i ) υε+υν
p
m
(i−1)(υε+υν)+υθ . Note that Ai < Ai+1 holds for i = N−k+1, . . . , N−
1, which implies
βN−k =
b
m
− γk(1− β∗N)
υε + υν
p
m
(N − 1)(υε + υν) + υθ +
N−1∑
i=N−k+1
γi−(N−k)Ai
<
b
m
− γk(1− β∗N)
υε + υν
p
m
(N − 1)(υε + υν) + υθ +
N∑
i=N−k+2
γi−(N−k+1)Ai
= β∗N−k+1 − γk(1− β∗N)
υε + υν
p
m
(N − 1)(υε + υν) + υθ ,
which in turn implies that (A-7) holds for k = 1, . . . , N − 1. This concludes the proof of
Theorem 2.
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